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In this paper, we use survey data from a sample of 29,000 households from 28 
transitional countries and Turkey to address two main questions: (i) is there any effect of 
social trust on the use of banking services and (ii) what are the household-level and 
country-specific determinants of using banking services in transitional countries. We 
found that the higher level of trust in people predicts a greater level in use of banking 
services by households regardless of the model specifications and econometric 
adjustments employed. This association appears to be more prominent among less 
educated respondents and in countries with low levels of legal enforcement. The results 
also suggest that location, income and wealth of households, along with country income 
level, legal enforcement and inflation rates strongly affect the decisions made by 
households regarding their use of banking services. In contrast, we found either a very 
small or non-significant impact with regard to bank ownership structure on the use of 
banking services across households.  
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   Following the seminal paper written by Coleman (1988), research on the potential link 
between social capital and economic performance has become widespread. Putnam 
(1993) documented a strong positive correlation between the degree of individuals’ free 
association with others and economic performance in Italy. Fukuyama (1995) showed the 
strong effect of social capital on economic development in general. Following these 
seminal early papers, a large body of empirical literature has emerged to validate the 
benefits of social capital on economic outcomes. Helliwell and Putnam (1995) argued 
that regions of Italy with high levels of social capital grew faster than did regions without 
high levels of social capital if initial income was held constant. Knack and Keefer (1997) 
demonstrated that for a sample of 29 market economies, higher levels of trust were 
conducive to growth. Knack and Zack (2001) further confirmed that this correlation 
persisted even after controlling for the quality of law enforcement.  
    One of the mechanisms through which social capital affects economic performance is 
through enhancing the prevailing level of social trust. The importance of social capital 
has been widely recognized in the context of microfinance, suggesting that social capital 
is associated with repayments in group lending (Sharma and Zeller, 1998; Van Bastelaer 
and Leathers, 2006; Karlan, 2007). Similarly, Calderon et al. (2002) empirically tested 
the relationship between social capital and a broad range of financial development 
measures for a cross-section of countries during the period 1980-1995. The authors 
reported that social capital is positively associated with a higher degree of financial 
efficiency and depth indicators such as bank assets, private credits by banks, bank 
overhead costs and the net interest margin. Finally, Guiso et al. (2004) evaluated the 
association between household social capital and various indicators of bank service 
utilization in Italy. The authors reported that households are more likely to use checks, 
invest in stocks, have access to credit lines and use less informal credit in the areas of 
Italy where social capital is high. 
    However, the question regarding the effect of social trust on the usage of banking 
services has been under-researched in transitional countries. With this context in mind, 
the purpose of this paper is to complement and extend the ongoing discussion of the 
effect of social capital on bank service utilization in two unique ways. First, to the best of 
our knowledge this is the first study which specifically focuses on social trust and the 
usage of formal banking services across a large set of transitional countries. We use high-
quality nationally-representative micro data set from 28 transitional countries as well as 
Turkey to identify the characteristics of households which may be associated with the 
usage of banking services. Furthermore, we combine micro-data from this population 
survey with a diverse set of aggregated macro economic indicators. Some of these 
indicators reflect the general level of economic development and macro-economic 
stability such as GDP per capita and inflation. Other indicators reflect the dimensions of 
national banking systems such as state ownership of banks and index of creditor rights 
protection. We also use several statistical adjustments to confirm the robustness of the 
estimated association between social capital and bank service utilization. Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, we use two simultaneous equation specifications with 
instrumental variables to isolate the impact of social trust on access to banking services 
and to avoid reverse causality. In this way, we are able to establish and quantify the true 




   Our results suggest that social trust is strongly and positively associated with the use of 
banking services. After controlling for a number of individual, household and country-
level characteristics as well as various specifications, we still found that higher levels of 
social trust are linked with increased use of banking services such as having bank 
accounts and bank cards. These associations are more salient among less educated people 
and in countries with low levels of legal enforcement. It was also found that the 
probability of households using banking services was higher in urban areas, and among 
those with more income and greater wealth. Our results also suggest that country-specific 
determinants such as GDP per capita, legal enforcement and inflation rates strongly affect 
household decisions regarding whether or not they will use banking services. We further 
found that bank ownership structure has a very small and statistically non-significant 
impact on the use of banking services. 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section following this 
introduction describes the data and empirical methodology used. The empirical results are 
presented and discussed in Section 3, and the conclusion can be found in Section 4.  
 
2. Data and methodological framework 
 
2.1 Data set 
Our study utilized the data set of the Life-in-Transition survey (LITS) that was conducted 
in 2006 by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with 
the World Bank (EBRD, 2007). The LITS micro data set includes 28 transitional 
countries comprising of 16 countries in Eastern Europe and 11 in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States
3
. Turkey was also included in the survey for comparison purposes. 
The aim of the LITS was to gather valuable insight into the ways that transition has 
affected the lives of people across the region. To achieve this aim, LITS assembled a 
comprehensive and directly comparable set of indicators about life satisfaction and living 
standards, poverty and inequality, satisfaction with public services, and attitudes towards 
a market economy and democracy during transition (EBRD, 2007).  
   A consistent sampling methodology was used across all the countries. One thousand 
households were interviewed in each country, with a total of 29,000 households 
interviewed altogether (Synovate, 2006). The sample is nationally representative. The 
LITS gathers data on a broad range of topics related to the various socio-demographic 
characteristics of respondents and households. The LITS questionnaire consists of two 
sections. The first section of the questionnaire is administered to household head who is 
defined as the most knowledgeable person in the household and is designed to collect 
information on household composition, housing, expenditures and wealth. The second 
section of the questionnaire is administered to adult household member in order to gather 
the individual’s personal information, information about her or his economic activities, 
values and attitudes, as well as life history. The individual member of household was 
selected for the interview based on the “last birthday” sampling rule. In reality, in 60% of 
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the households, the household head and the main responded were the same person (Beck 
and Brown, 2011). In other words, most of the respondents were also the households 
heads. The overall household interview success rate was 63 percent, the respondent 
interview success rate was 72 percent and the refusal rate was 23 percent (EBRD, 2007). 
   In addition to the LITS micro data, we used country-level information on the macro and 
institutional variables that might have affected the degree of household access to banking 
services. Table A.1 in the appendix reports the sources and definitions of the country-
level data set, along with the actual interview questions.  
 
2.2 Methodological framework 
 
Outcome variable: the usage of banking services 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate how social trust affects the usage of 
banking services in transitional countries. Two indicators available in the LITS are 
employed to gauge the extent of the usage of banking services. The variable Accounts is 
equal to 1 if the household has a bank account, and 0 if it does not. The variable Cards is 
equal to 1 if the household has a debit or credit bank card, and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Social capital  
Trust in people has been used as an indicator of social trust that LITS measures through 
the question “Generally speaking, would you say that today most people can be trusted, 
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. There are five possible 
responses to this question on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that the person has 
complete distrust in people, and 5 means that most people can be trusted. These responses 
were aggregated as a new binary variable getting 1 if the respondent considers that other 
people can be trusted (answers 4 or 5 of the question), and 0 if otherwise (answers 1, 2 or 
3). For this study, a single trust measure, rather than a set of dummies, has been used due 
to the instrumental variable analysis employed later.  
 
Binominal probit model 
Given that the outcome variables are binary dependent variables, we commenced with an 
estimation of binary probit regression. We estimated the model described above in two 
steps. Both steps use the same indicators of banking penetration and social capital, while 
other covariates vary between steps. In the first step, the indicators of banking service 
usage have been related to the individual, household, and country characteristics (Beck 
and Brown, 2011). At the household and individual levels we used the following 
covariates: household location, income, and wealth along with the respondent’s age, 
gender, level of education, employment and minority status (e.g. Guiso et al. 2004; Beck 
and Brown, 2011). All these variables have been generated from the LITS. Among the 
household level characteristics, we expect that higher levels of current household income 
(proxied by per capita household monthly expenditures in USD) and longer term wealth 
status (proxied by car ownership) are positively associated with the use of banking 
services. Conversely, we expect that living in rural areas will have opposite effect. Since 
Beck and Brown (2011) postulate that household use of banking services are influenced 
by the respondent’s level of education, social integration in the form of minority status, 
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and other individual-level characteristics of household members, such as gender and age, 
these individual-level variables were employed as controls.  
   At the country level, we controlled for country-level financial infrastructure and 
economic development indicators which are proxied by the legal rights of creditors and 
borrowers, the level of per capita GDP, the structure of bank ownership and the level of 
inflation (e.g. Calderon et al. 2002; Guiso et al. 2004). It is expected that better law 
enforcement and higher per capita GDP will increase the likelihood of the usage of 
banking services. In contrast, a negative relationship between the inflation level and a 
household’s use of banking services is expected. Lastly, despite contradictory evidence 
that exists regarding the relationship between the ownership structure within the banking 
system and the use of banking services by households, we hypothesize that state 
ownership of banks could lead to an increase in the likelihood of banking service usage 
among households (e.g. Baums, 1994, World Bank, 2007).  
 
Robustness analysis 
In the second step, a number of econometric adjustments were employed to check for the 
robustness of the results. First, the country fixed effects were controlled for. For this 
reason, the country dummy variables were included with Ukraine as the default. It is 
assumed that we have highly robust results if the coefficients driven from the full sample 
are mainly confirmed. We also hypothesize that household-level effects, along with 
social trust variables, do not become weaker because of the inclusion of the country fixed 
effect. The disadvantage of this technique is that it does not allow us to test for the 
robustness of country-level variables and is limited to testing for the robustness of 
household-specific characteristics.    
   Second, to rule out the possibility that social trust is capturing the efficiency of the legal 
system, we re-estimated the basic specification for the sample of countries with relatively 
low credit rights which are defined as credit rights below the median of 5 (Cuiso et al., 
2004). We hypothesize that higher levels of social trust will play a more important role in 
predicting the usage of banking services in countries with lower levels of legal 
enforcement than in the overall sample.    
   Third, to rule out the possibility that social trust is capturing the effect of higher levels 
of education, we re-estimated the model for the sample of countries with relatively low 
levels of education. A low level of education is defined as an education level below the 
mean of 3.4 (Guiso et al. 2004). We hypothesize that the marginal impact of social capital 
is higher among uneducated individuals, inasmuch as an uneducated individual may 
require greater levels of trust to make the same financial investment that a more highly 
educated person would make. Therefore, we expect that the effect of social capital will be 
higher in the sample of countries with relatively low levels of education than in the 
overall sample.   
 
Simultaneous equations regression models 
The simultaneous equations model with an instrumental variable was employed to 
address the problem of endogeneity associated with the possible bias effect of social trust 
on the use of banking services. It is noteworthy that a more developed financial system 
may improve the trust of people who may be encouraged to intermediate or function 
financially. Likewise, better access to financial services may encourage people to 
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participate in social organizations and better integrate into society given the possibility of 
organizing events that could be funded by financial institutions (Calderon et al. 2002). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect the existence of reverse causality between social 
trust and access to banking services. 
   It is not easy to find the best instruments here, since instruments should be correlated 
with social trust, but uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression equation that 
estimates banking development. Therefore, we used two instrumental variables: the soviet 
dummy variable and the religious fractionalization variable (Calderon et al. (2002). The 
dummy variable for Post-Soviet Union countries is justified by the notion that transitional 
countries that used to be part of the same union might share cultural traits and a historical 
heritage that would have an effect on the level of trust in those countries, and that may be 
different from other transitional economies. The religious fractionalization variable is 
proposed to capture religious patterns not accounted for the soviet dummy variable. 
Using the LITS question “What is your religion?” this variable is calculated for each 
country as the sum of the squares of the fractions (shares) of the three largest religious 
origins (Muslim, Christian, and Atheist) in that country.  
   In addition, the binominal nature of the outcome variable and the impact variables pose 
an additional challenge beyond the formidable challenge of identifying an appropriate 
instrument. To address this challenge, two different models have been estimated to 
compare across methods as a way of corroborating the results. We begin with estimating 
the standard simultaneous equations (2SLS) model. Using the 2SLS allows us to perform 
standard tests to confirm that our instruments are correlated with social trust, but 
uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression equation (Wooldridge, 2002).    
   However, the 2SLS does not take into account the binary nature of social capital and 
bank usage variables. Consequently, the bivariate probit model, which explicitly takes 
into account the binominal nature of the outcome and impact variables, was estimated. In 
contrast to the 2SLS, a bivariate probit model is an appropriate method for estimating the 
simultaneous equations model when outcome and impact are binominal variables 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). After the 2SLS confirmed that our instruments are 
correlated with social trust, but uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression 
equation, we estimated the bivariate probit with the same set of instrumental variables as 
in the 2SLS (Conway and Kutinova, 2006).  
 
  
3. Results and discussions 
Table 1 reports summary statistics and the simple correlation between the use of banking 
service indicators and social trust, along with a broad array of household-level as well as 
country-specific variables.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
   As was mentioned in the previous section of the paper, there are two indicators of 
banking development which were used as dependent variables in the regression models. 
The first measure is an indicator variable of whether or not a household has a checking 
account. The second measure is an indicator variable of whether or not a household owns 
a credit or deposit card from any commercial bank. On average, the percentage of 
households with bank accounts (37 percent) appears to be higher when compared with 
the share of households that hold a debit or credit card (31 percent).     
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   In addition, Table 1 shows that the use of bank accounts and bank cards are positively 
correlated (0.62) with each other and that both indicators of banking development are 
positively linked with social trust (0.012 with bank accounts and 0.011 with bank cards), 
although these correlations are rather small.    
 
3.1 Results of binominal probit models  
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects of probit estimates for the use of banking services. 
Panel (A) displays the marginal effects of the independent variables on the use of bank 
accounts and cards without taking the country-level variables into consideration. As 
shown, having trust in people increases the likelihood of having a bank account by about 
1.5 percentage points, while having no statistically significant effect on the use of debit or 
credit cards. All household-level covariates are significant and in the predicted direction. 
Thus, residing in rural areas reduces the likelihood of having a bank account or bank 
card. On the contrary, having a higher level of household expenditures or owning a car 
increases the likelihood of having a bank account or card.   
   Country-level variables are added in equations in Panel (B). After controlling for 
country-level variables, the positive effect of trust on the probability of having a bank 
account increased to 2.3 percentage points. Furthermore, the effect of trust on using debit 
or credit cards is found to be statistically significant. Trusting people increased the 
probability of using a bank card by about 1.6 percentage points. Among country-level 
variables, better legal enforcement, greater GDP per capita and lower inflation are all 
significantly associated with higher levels of bank service utilization, both in the form of 
having an account and a bank card. In comparison, state ownership of banks shows a 
positive effect only on having a bank card.     
 
3.2 Results of robustness analysis 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
How robust are the probit estimates of social trust on the use of banking services? To 
check the robustness of the results, Table 3 first displays the outcome of the probit 
models with country-fixed effects in Panel A. The results show that the positive 
relationship between social trust and the use of banking services remains significant. 
Having trust in people increases the likelihood of having a bank account and a bank card 
by about 8.4 and 1.1 percentage points respectively.  
    The results of probit models estimated for the samples of households with poor levels 
of education are reported in Panel B of Table 3. The results demonstrate that among the 
households with poor educational levels, social trust increases the probability of using a 
bank account and card by approximately 3.2 and 2 percentage points respectively. As 
explained in the previous section, it is expected that the effect of social trust on the use of 
banking services would be higher in the samples of countries with relatively low levels of 
education. Indeed, the obtained estimates of the social capital effects for countries with 
lower levels of education are higher than the estimates reported for the whole sample in 
Table 2. 
   The results of probit models estimated for the samples of households in countries where 
legal enforcement is not prompt are reported in Panel C of Table 3.  In these countries, 
social trust increases the probability of using a bank account and card by approximately 
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3.8 and 3.5 percentage points respectively. Again as expected, the effect of social capital 
is higher in countries with lower levels of legal enforcement inasmuch as the obtained 
estimates of social capital effects are higher than the estimates reported for the whole 
sample. 
   Lastly, all covariates in Panels A, B, and C have the expected direction.    
 
3.3 Results of the simultaneous equations regression models 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 displays the results of the 2SLS and bivariate probit models. The results of the 
2SLS are reported in the first two columns of the table. The upper section of the table 
presents the results of the main regression equation. The main finding is that after 
controlling for endogeneity, having social trust positively affects the propensity of having 
a bank account and bank card. The coefficient of the 2SLS is much higher than those of 
the binomial probit regression model reported above, although the standard errors are 
also much higher. Among household level variables, an increase in household 
expenditures and car ownership increases the likelihood of having a bank account and 
bank card. In contrast, living in a rural area has a negative effect. Among country level 
variables, improvement of credit rights and growth in GDP per capita lead to an increase 
in the propensity for bank account and card usage, while inflation shows a negative 
effect. Interestingly, the finding also confirms that state ownership of banks is positively 
associated with the use of banking services, although this association is rather negligible. 
The results of the first regression equation are reported in the lower section of the Table 
4. Both instruments show a significant effect on social trust. This finding confirms the 
relevance of selected instruments.  
   The lowest rows of the table present the tests for the estimated 2SLS (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). The non-significant results of Sargan’s test indicate 
that the selected instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the main regression 
equation. The significant value of the Anderson test indicates that the instruments are 
adequate for identifying this equation. Likewise, significant results for the Wu-Hausman 
and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests show the presence of endogeneity and confirm that an 
estimation of the simultaneous equations regression model would produce more 
consistent results than would single equation regression.  
   The results of the simultaneous equations bivariate probit regression in the form of 
marginal effects are reported in the last two columns of Table 4. The results suggest that 
social trust increases the probability of using banking services by approximately 70 
percentage points. The results of bivariate probit are lower than the results obtained by 
the 2SLS, although standard errors in bivariate probit are also lower than in the 2SLS. In 
addition, it should be noted that all covariates in bivariate probit have the same sign as in 
the 2SLS. Finally, the significant result of the Likelihood Ratio test that is reported in the 
last row of the table signals the presence of endogeneity (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
Consequently, estimating the bivariate probit instead of single equation probit appears to 
be appropriate.  
 
4.Conclusion  
In this paper, we aimed to assess the effect of social capital on the use of banking services 
in transitional countries. Combining the LITS micro data with aggregated economic data 
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across 28 transitional countries and Turkey, we found that social capital has a positive 
effect on the usage of banking services. This conclusion is robust to statistical 
adjustments and two simultaneous equation specifications with instrumental variables. 
Furthermore, we found that social capital matters even more in the countries with low 
levels of education and poor degrees of law enforcement. In addition, our results suggest 
that country-specific determinants such as GDP per capita, legal enforcement and 
inflation rates strongly affect the decisions of households with regard to using banking 
services. In contrast, we found that the effect of the bank ownership structure has either a 
very small or statistically non-significant impact on the use of banking services across 
households in transitional countries. Lastly, our results suggest that the probability of 
having households that use banking services is higher in urban areas and among the 
households with higher income and wealth.  
   From a policy standpoint, the empirical findings of this study suggest some ways in 
which households in transitional countries could be encouraged to use banking services. 
Our results demonstrate that transitional countries which suffer low levels of education 
and law enforcement should be compensated for them with greater social trust for the 
sake of higher financial inclusion among their households. Therefore, all policy efforts to 
address deficiencies in social capital and improve social trust should be of great priority 
in transitional countries where a strong legal enforcement and high levels of education 
are generally low. It is noteworthy that the impact of social trust would be even more 
salient if we consider the suggestion made by Putnam (1993) and La Part et al. (1997a) 
that a lack of social capital may negatively affect the functioning of existing formal 
institutions.  
   From a methodological standpoint, we demonstrate that strong endogeneity exists 
between the use of banking services and social trust. Consequently, ignoring endogeneity 
and estimating the single stage regression model will likely lead to biased results. 
Another interesting methodological result of our study is that although the literature 
commonly claims that choosing suitable instruments is difficult (e.g. Durlauf and 
Fafchamps, 2004; Grootaert et al. 2004), this study was able to identify some valid 
instruments with regard to social trust. As suggested by Knack and Keefer (1997) and 
Calderon et al. (2002), our study was able to confirm that some variables concerning the 
ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of the population could be used as valid 
instruments in the social capital literature. 
   Finally, two main limitations of our study should be mentioned. Because of data 
limitations, the level of social capital was gauged by a single question, and access to 
banking services was measured by only two questions, and hence the study results could 
be prone to measurement error. Moreover, there is a need for further research to help 
identify the key determinants that affect social trust and that will be useful in policy 
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Summary Statistics and Correlations     
  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
 Panel B: Correlation analysis 
  Mean SD Min Max   Bank accounts 
Debit/credit 
cards 
Individual and household-level variables 
Bank accounts  0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00  1.0000  
Debit/credit cards  0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00  0.6194** 1.0000 
Trust in people  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00  0.0122** 0.0109* 
Female  0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00  -0.0177** -0.0173** 
Minority  0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00  -0.0558** -0.0429** 
Age  46.42 17.52 18.00 97.00  -0.0441** -0.1267** 
Education  0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00  0.1825** 0.1863** 
Employment  0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00  0.1545** 0.2063** 
Rural  0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00  -0.1346** -0.1881** 
Expenses  7.50 0.91 0.98 10.25  0.5054** 0.4825** 
Car   0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00  0.3528** 0.3314** 
         
Country-level variables 
Credit rights  5.47 1.82 1.00 9.00  0.1741** 0.0835** 
State ownership  13.71 19.72 0.00 70.20  -0.1448** -0.0841** 
Inflation  6.37 4.27 0.50 16.50  -0.2551** -0.2306** 
GDP per capita  8.12 1.03 5.90 9.81   0.1308** 0.1732** 
Note:  Data are rounded up 
            * Statistical significance at the .10 level 







Table 2  
The effect of social trust on the use of banking services (marginal effects)  
  Panel A  Panel B 
 Account              Card  Account Card 
Individual and household-level variables 
  
Trust in people 0.0150** 0.0076  0.0239*** 0.0161** 
 (0.0072) (0.0066)  (0.0073) (0.0066) 
Female  0.0323*** 0.0320***  0.0373*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0061)  (0.0068) (0.0061) 
Age 0.0020*** -0.0008***  0.0014*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Education 0.0548*** 0.0451***  0.0823*** 0.0681*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0063)  (0.0070) (0.0063) 
Minority -0.0519*** -0.0296***  -0.0583*** -0.0405*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0097)  (0.0106) (0.0095) 
Employment 0.0503*** 0.0818***  0.0590*** 0.0845*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0066)  (0.0074) (0.0066) 
Rural -0.0263*** -0.0923***  -0.0264*** -0.0868*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0061)  (0.0070) (0.0061) 
Expenses 0.2978*** 0.2473***  0.2638*** 0.2202*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0043)  (0.0049) (0.0044) 
Car 0.1816*** 0.1390***  0.1776*** 0.1344*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0067)  (0.0072) (0.0067) 
      
Country-level variables 
Credit rights    0.0369*** 0.0179*** 
    (0.0020) (0.0017) 
State ownership    0.0003 0.0019*** 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Inflation    -0.0151*** -0.0137*** 
    (0.0010) (0.0010) 








Pseudo R2 0.2591 0.261  0.2848 0.2849 
Number of 
observations 24969 24964   24969 24964 
Notes.   The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
             * Significance at .10 level for two-tailed test. 
             ** Significance at .05 level for two-tailed test. 




Table 3  
The effect of social trust on the use of banking services in different model specifications (marginal effects)  
 Panel A Panel B  Panel C 
 Account Card Account Card  Account Card 
Individual and household-level variables 
Trust in people 0.0842*** 0.0116* 0.0324*** 0.0203* 0.0384*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0066) (0.0116) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
Female 0.0508*** 0.0260*** 0.0237** 0.0257*** -0.0049 0.0220* 
 (0.0218) (0.0061) (0.0102) (0.0095) (0.0117) (0.0119) 
Age -0.0075*** -0.0041*** 0.0013*** -0.0015*** 0.0011*** -0.0022*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 0.2447*** 0.0693*** 0.1088*** 0.0850*** 0.0434*** 0.0483** 
 (0.0231) (0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0123) (0.0125) 
Minority -0.1451*** -0.0372*** -0.0731*** -0.0492*** -0.0489*** -0.0381** 
 (0.0366) (0.0095) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0164) 
Employment 0.2397*** 0.0892*** 0.0101 0.0651*** 0.0272*** 0.0207 
 (0.0237) (0.0067) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0127) 
Rural -0.1823*** -0.0969*** -0.0334*** -0.1207*** -0.0843*** -0.1227*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0062) (0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Expenses 0.4469*** 0.1372*** 0.3056*** 0.2679*** 0.1015*** 0.1276*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0092) (0.0094) 
Car 0.4689*** 0.1202*** 0.1862*** 0.1599*** 0.1169*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0068) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0129) 
       
Country-level variables    
Credit rights   0.0550*** 0.0083** -0.3991*** -0.2468** 
   (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0193) (0.0170) 
State ownership   0.0000 0.0017*** -0.0227*** -0.0144*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Inflation   0.0067** 0.0003 -0.0534*** -0.0405*** 
   (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
GDP per capita   0.1284*** 0.0663*** 0.1392*** 0.0639*** 
   (0.0086) (0.0080) (0.0107) (0.0108) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2591 0.375 0.3278 0.3108 0.3334 0.2617 
Number of observations 24969 24964 11424 11422   5921 5920 
Notes. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
             The country fixed effects are omitted to conserve the space. 
             * Significance at .10 level for two-tailed test. 
             ** Significance at .05 level for two-tailed test. 




Table 4  
The effect of social capital on the use of banking services - IV Regression Results   
  
Standard simultaneous 
equations (2SLS)   
  
Bivariate  
probit (biprobit)  
 Bank Account 
Credit 
 Card Bank Account 
Credit 
 Card 
Main equation for Using Bank Services is estimated 
Trust in people 3.1819*** 1.5607***  0.6925*** 0.6990*** 
 (0.6486) (0.3505)  (0.0128) (0.0231) 
Rural -0.0364* -0.0808***  -0.0093* -0.0289*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0110)  (0.0137) (0.0194) 
Female -0.0007 0.0148  -0.0018 0.0012 
 (0.0206) (0.0111)  (0.0137) (0.0146) 
Age -0.0002 -0.0020***  -0.0001 -0.0007*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Education 0.0055 0.0249**  0.0016 0.0036 
 (0.0237) (0.0128)  (0.0156) (0.0180) 
Minority -0.0391 -0.0293*  -0.0079 -0.0090 
 (0.0316) (0.0170)  (0.0219) (0.0226) 
Employment -0.0467 0.0356**  -0.0162*** -0.0028 
 (0.0292) (0.0158)  (0.0153) (0.0202) 
Expenses 0.1916*** 0.1654***  0.0457*** 0.0606*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0069)  (0.0246) (0.0356) 
Car 0.1570*** 0.1353***  0.0278*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0117)  (0.0211) (0.0253) 
Credit rights 0.0685*** 0.0357***  0.0159*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0050)  (0.0051) (0.0048) 
State ownership 0.0026*** 0.0026***  0.0007*** 0.0012*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Inflation -0.0220*** -0.0148***  -0.0057*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0020)  (0.0022) (0.0029) 
GDP per capita 0.0588*** 0.0668***  0.0150*** 0.0249*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0073)  (0.0080) (0.0115) 
First (instrumented equation) for Social Trust is 
estimated      
Rural 0.0043 0.0043    
 (0.0061) (0.0061)    
Female 0.0100* 0.0102*    
 (0.0060) (0.0060)    
Age 0.0003* 0.0003*    
 (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Education 0.0184*** 0.0185***    
 (0.0063) (0.0063)    
Minority -0.0059 -0.0058    
 (0.0097) (0.0097)    
Employment 0.0292*** 0.0295***    
 (0.0064) (0.0064)    
Expenses -0.0029 -0.0027    
 (0.0040) (0.0040)    
Car 0.0014 0.0009    
 (0.0066) (0.0066)    
Credit rights -0.0120*** -0.0120***    
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 (0.0018) (0.0018)    
State ownership -0.0009*** -0.0009***    
 (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Inflation 0.0032*** 0.0032***    
 (0.0008) (0.0008)    
GDP per capita -0.0095*** -0.0095***    
 (0.0036) (0.0036)    
Soviet 0.0182*** 0.0182***    
 (0.0064) (0.0064)    
Religious fractionalization -0.0757*** -0.0751***    
 (0.0176) (0.0176)    
Number of observation 24969 24964  24969 24964 
      
Testing overidentification      
Sargan’s test ( p-value χ2)   0.8366 0.1040    
Testing adequacy of instruments      
Anderson correlation LM statistic χ2 25.58*** 25.31***    
Testing endogeneity      
Wu-Hausman F test  342.06  *** 84.02**    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test 337.64  *** 83.79***    
Wald test for endogeneity χ2       162.08*** 93.23*** 
Notes. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
            The estimates for biprobit models are shown in marginal effects. 
            * Significance at .10 level for two-tailed test. 
            ** Significance at .05 level for two-tailed test. 






Appendix  A 
 
Table A.1  
Variable Description and Data Sources     
Variable  Description   Source Year 
Individual and household-level variables 
Check accounts Whether a household member has a bank account. 1=yes, 
0=no.  LITS 2006 
Debit/credit cards Whether a household member holds a debit or credit card. 
1=yes, 0=no.  LITS 2006 
Trust in people 
Would a respondent say that today most people can be 
trusted, or that he/she can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? 1=can be trusted, 0=otherwise.  LITS 2006 
Rural 
Whether a household lives in rural area. 1=yes, 0=otherwise.  LITS 2006 
Female Whether the gender of a respondent is female. 1=yes, 0=no.  LITS 2006 
Minority Whether a respondent is perceived to be member of 
minority. 1=yes, 0=no.  LITS 2006 
Age Age of a respondent.  LITS 2006 
Education 
Whether a respondent has tertiary-level education or 
received any professional training. 1=yes, 0=otherwise.  LITS 2006 
Employment 
Whether a respondent had formally employed in the past. 
1=yes, 0=otherwise.  LITS 2006 
Expenses Per capita total household monthly expenses in USD (Log)  LITS 2006 
Car Whether a household member holds a car. 1=yes, 0=no.  LITS 2006 
     
Country-level variables 
 
Credit rights Legal rights index for secured creditors, scale 0-10.  DB 2006 
State ownership Asset share of state controlled banks in domestic banking 
system (%)  ERBD 2005 
Inflation Increase of consumer prices (annual average)  EBRD 2003-05 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in USD per year (Log)   EBRD 2005 
 
